Introduction
henceforth refer to as "established names," in the native population, but that have since been eclipsed by more novel ones. This tendency, which we term "acculturative conservatism," appears among immigrants to the United States in both the immigration wave of 1880 -1920 (Sue and Telles 2007 Lieberson 2000, 209-22; Watkins and London 1994) and the post-1965 wave (Lieberson 2000, 195-200) . Indeed, it seems to have been such a significant force in American culture that it slowed down the overall pace of change in US names in the early twentieth century.
To illustrate, we display in figure 1 the rate, over the years 1880 to 2010, at which the most popular names in one decade were replaced by a different set of most popular names in the following decade. As Lieberson and Lynn (2003; cf. Lieberson 2000) show, the rate of change in cultural forms has been steadily increasing since around the middle of the eighteenth century in all major Western countries-a trend that reflects the increase of fashion (and the decline of tradition) as an influence on cultural practice. Yet, figure 1 shows a significant slowdown in the replacement of the most popular names around 1920. It is hard to be certain what was responsible for this apparent slowdown in fashion, but it is consistent with the possibility that the massive wave of immigrants who arrived in the United States between 1880 and 1920 (see Lieberson 1980) represented a powerful conservative influence on American culture. Poly fit of top 500 0 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 Years Turnover 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 NOTE: Adjusted name turnover calculates the yearly change in the popularity distribution of names in a manner that removes the influence of the shape of the distribution (see Zhang et al., 2013 ; cf., Lieberson and Lynn 2003) .
But if acculturative conservatism is such a powerful social force, what mechanism is responsible for it? Prior research (e.g., Watkins and London 1994; Gerhards and Hans 2009) has generally attributed immigrants' choice of formerly popular names to a deficit of mainstream cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) -that is, knowledge about norms and standards, and the skills for applying them, that members of the host society are generally presumed to possess. As newcomers, immigrants will generally be relatively ignorant of the host country's culture due to their "disconnected[ness] from current developments in the newly adopted society" (Lieberson 2000, 174) . As a result, immigrants may make mistakes in estimating which names are currently popular (ibid., 200) . Along the same lines, other researchers have noted how a lack of inter-cultural contact (Gerhard and Hans 2009), poor fluency in the host society's language (Watson and London 1994) , residential or school segregation (Watson and London 1994) , and disengagement from popular culture could each make immigrants less familiar with current cultural trends and account for their disproportionate selection of established names. And this interpretation of acculturative conservatism reflects the more general tendency among all schools of immigrant incorporation (see Esser [2010] for a review)-whether "traditional assimilation theory" (e.g., Gordon 1964) , "segmented assimilation theory" (e.g., Portes 2007), or "mainstream-assimilation theory (e.g., Alba, Kasnitz, and Waters 2011)-to regard acculturation as a necessary first step for successful incorporation, one that is first and foremost a matter of becoming knowledgeable about the host culture.
But there is reason to doubt that acculturation is solely a matter of cultural capital acquisition. Instead, immigrants may make conservative cultural choices even when they are knowledgeable about the mainstream culture of the host society. The key insight of recent cultural sociology (see especially Swidler 1986 Swidler , 2001 )-that is, that "people know more culture than they use" (Swidler 1986, 277) and that cultural expression thus reflects strategic choice-provides the general basis for considering this possibility. Moreover, while this key insight is foreign to classical models of the acculturation process, it is congenial with two advances in the more recent literature. First, recent research recognizes that the host culture is highly heterogeneous, such that immigrant communities must effectively select from cultural models with different implications for future mobility (e.g., that of the white Anglo society or that of the black ghetto; see especially Portes and Zhou [1993] ). Second, acculturation is now seen less as a zero-sum replacement of "old country" cultural patterns with those of the receiving country than a process whereby immigrants become skilled in the culture of the host society while retaining their proficiency and commitment to the culture of their immigrant community (see Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) . Thus, while past research on acculturation ignores the possibility that immigrants may refrain from acting on elements of the host culture that they know, more recent models assume a more agentic immigrant who can more easily accommodate strategic deployment of cultural expression.
Moreover, the importance of viewing acculturation as having a significant strategic aspect becomes clear once we recognize that host cultures are not only heterogeneous but are a moving target. Many aspects of mainstream culture (e.g., music, cuisine, attire, even language [slang] ) are subject to fashion trends (see , and such trends pose (implicit) dilemmas for any member of a culture regardless of whether she is an immigrant or a native: Should one choose a form of cultural expression that is novel and thus still unusual, or should one choose a form that is more established and therefore more common? The advantages of distinguishing oneself as a trendsetter are generally outweighed by the risk that difference will be interpreted as "deviance"-that is, as a signal that one is either lacking in mainstream cultural capital or uncommitted to the values and institutions supported by the majority (Obukhova, Zuckerman, and Zhang 2014; cf. Simmel 1957; Zuckerman forthcoming) . Accordingly, while there is much experimentation with names in modern society, very few name choices truly challenge the dominant conventions (e.g., almost no American parents select names that are more than five syllables long).
This framing of the matter suggests an alternative explanation for acculturative conservatism among immigrants-that is, that it reflects an attempt to address the incompleteness of their membership in the host society. Even if they recognize the advantages of adopting a "mainstream" name rather than an "ethnic" one (see Goldstein and Stecklov 2016) , they may see it as risky to choose a trendy mainstream name rather than an established one. As discussed, native members of a society are generally conservative with respect to adopting innovative cultural practices due to the risks involved. As such, it is straightforward to expect that immigrants will be even more conservative since their membership in the host society is less secure than those of the native born (e.g., Park 1928; Eisenstadt 1953) . In general, individuals whose membership in their group or community is insecure are more likely to be concerned that their expressions of difference will be regarded as deviance than those whose membership is taken for granted or those who are completely excluded from membership (for a review, see Phillips and Zuckerman [2001] ). The implication is that even when immigrants are aware of recent fashion, they may select established names to signal their bona fide status as members of the host society. It then follows that insofar as immigrants experience only incomplete acceptance as members of the host society, they will not adopt innovative cultural practices as freely as do native members.
The objective of this article is to gain greater insight into the manner by which immigrants select among native cultural forms, and specifically to test our argument that acculturative conservatism need not reflect a deficit of cultural capital. To meet this objective, we develop a novel analytic approach and apply it to examine trends in given names among an immigrant population that is unusually well suited for such a task. The proposed analytic approach focuses on a second dimension (in addition to their relative popularity) by which cultural forms may be distinguished-that is, whether they have been rising or falling in popularity. We assume that for a given level of popularity, only someone who has significant mainstream cultural capital would know whether the popularity of a cultural practice is on the rise or in decline; 1 and we further assume that all things equal, any member of a culture will seek to avoid cultural practices whose popularity is falling (cf. Berger and LeMens 2009) . It follows then that we can infer the level of mainstream cultural capital held by immigrants (and anyone else in the society) based on their tendency to avoid names whose popularity has been falling. If immigrants are more likely than the general population to pick established names whose popularity is falling, this would indicate that they lack mainstream cultural capital. By contrast, if immigrants tend to avoid established names whose popularity is falling, this would suggest that they do not lack mainstream cultural capital and it would be consistent with the idea that their preference for established names reflects a lack of security in membership.
To apply this strategy, we compare the names Jewish immigrants to the United States gave to their male children in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with those adopted by their mainstream contemporaries. The data on the general population are publicly available on the Social Security Administration website. 2 The data on the children of Jewish immigrants come from lists of the names of Jewish servicemen who served in the US Armed Forces during World War II. These Jewish servicemen were mostly born between 1917 and 1920, near the tail end of the great wave of immigration from Eastern Europe that began in 1880. The vast majority of these servicemen would thus have been named by either first-or secondgeneration immigrant parents, most of whom lived in immigrant Jewish neighborhoods in New York and a few other large Northeastern and Midwestern cities.
Besides the availability of such data, the Jewish population is a particularly good research site for two reasons. First, since Jewish parents also gave their children separate Hebrew-character names to express religious identity and " ethnic maintenance" (Gerhards and Hans 2009; Sue and Telles 2007) , they were relatively free from the "cake of custom" (Park 1928, 881) in their choices of English names-except (as we show below) in their avoidance of names with strong Christian associations. Second, and as discussed below, Jewish immigrants of this period were unusual in the speed with which they learned mainstream American culture while being barred from full participation in the mainstream economy and society. Accordingly, this population represents a particularly good opportunity to see whether indeed acculturative conservatism is present even where the immigrant population does not suffer from a deficit of cultural capital.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review how cultural capital and insecurity in membership are intertwined in the immigrant experience. We then present our analytical approach and explain how it applies in the study population of early 20th-century Jewish Americans. We then proceed to discuss our data and present results. Our analysis produces four notable findings. First, we find that Jewish acculturation to American naming patterns was selective, in the clear avoidance of names with strong Christian associations. Second, instead of these Christian names, Jewish parents did not select names with strong Jewish associations but rather names that had been relatively unpopular among Americans. We discuss this unexpected pattern of "subcultural acculturation" further in the Discussion section and relate it to recent research suggesting that American Jews were advantaged by ethnic distinctiveness (Goldstein and Stecklov 2016) . Third, we find significant evidence of acculturative conservatism, in that Jewish parents favored established names. And finally, we find that these parents preferred established names that remained popular rather than those whose popularity was falling, indicating that their acculturative conservatism did not stem from a lack of mainstream cultural capital. This result extends the key insight that cultural practices reflect strategic application of knowledge and shows how we can apply it to sharpen our understanding of what has long been recognized as a key barrier to immigrant incorporation-that is, the challenge of acculturation.
Lack of Security versus Cultural Capital
What might account for immigrants' apparent tendency toward acculturative conservatism? As discussed in the Introduction, two possible explanations for acculturative conservatism are (1) that immigrants lack the mainstream cultural capital to succeed at being fashionable and (2) that they feel insecure in their host society. In this section, we discuss these two mechanisms and explain why it is difficult to separate them empirically.
Prior research has tended to attribute immigrant conservatism to immigrants' dated beliefs about what is most popular in the native population. To be sure, all parents operate in the dark when picking their children's names. In particular, it is common for parents to think they have selected a novel (if not too unusual) name, only to discover that many of their contemporaries picked the same name (Lieberson 2000, 154-56) . But while such "errors" reflect the difficulty of estimating contemporary demand for a name, they also reflect a common ability to recognize, and thus to avoid, names that are no longer in fashion. By contrast, immigrants might not have the same ability to recognize a fashion that has passed and thus should be avoided (Lieberson 2000, 199-200 ; see also Watkins and London 1994; Gerhards and Hans 2009) . Consider that insofar as immigrant families are residentially and socially removed from native families, they are more likely to encounter native adults (and learn their names) than native children (and their names) and established names will have built up a large stock in the native population, especially among adults.
As reviewed in the Introduction, an alternative explanation for acculturative conservatism derives from the general insight that knowledge of culture is necessary but insufficient for explaining cultural expression (see especially Swidler 1986 Swidler , 2001 ). In particular, any member of a society can be expected to be relatively conservative in deviating from the dominant fashion because in the first instance such deviation suggests that one (or one's child, in the case of a given name) is either culturally incompetent or uncommitted to the host culture (Obukhova, Zuckerman, and Zhang 2014) . The desire to demonstrate both cultural competence and commitment to the host culture should be even stronger in the case of immigrants since their membership in the host society is not taken for granted (Eisenstadt 1953, 170) , and it may have a significant impact on mobility (Goldstein and Stecklov 2016) . Thus, insofar as immigrant parents do not need to signal "ethnic maintenance," they can be expected to emphasize their host-culture identity by adopting currently established names, as these names are most prevalent in the native population, even if these names are not currently the most popular. 3 The two explanations are distinct, but they are difficult to disentangle empirically because they both rely on the fact that formerly popular or "established" names have a greater stock at any given time than newly popular names. According to the cultural-capital explanation, this fact leads immigrants to be significantly more familiar with established names than with newly popular names and thereby to mistakenly believe that established names are fashionable. By contrast, the immigrant-insecurity explanation assumes that common knowledge about what is established and what is newly popular shapes how immigrants' desire to signal membership in the host society is expressed. Because established names are more common, these names are safe signals of membership in the host society; adopting such an established name will not raise questions about one's cultural competence or political commitments. As a result, evidence of acculturative conservatism need not indicate that immigrants are less knowledgeable about the latest fashions; it could simply indicate greater insecurity among immigrants.
Proposed Analytic Strategy: Distinguishing Falling from Rising Names
The ideal way to disentangle the immigrant-insecurity mechanism from that of lack of mainstream cultural capital would involve direct measurement of the sense of security and of cultural knowledge among immigrant (as compared to native) parents at the time of the naming of their children. In the absence of such a direct method, we propose to make some progress via an indirect method that tests whether in fact immigrants who exhibit acculturative conservatism are indeed poorly informed about current fashion. To accomplish this, we examine not only whether immigrants adopt established or novel names, but also whether immigrants choose a name that has been "rising" or "falling" in popularity.
Our key assumption is that parents prefer names that have been rising in popularity and avoid those that are falling in popularity since the former will generally be regarded as more fashionable than the latter cf. Berger and Le Mens 2009 ). More generally, we assume that parents care not only about whether a name is currently popular, but also about the trend in a name's popularity. Children are likely to use their name over their entire lives. Parents cannot tell at the time of naming how many other parents are making similar or different choices at the same time, and so they must rely on recent trends to forecast the future.
Consider a concrete example from the data we analyze below. Table 1 displays four names-Robert, Fred, Donald, and Raleigh-and their popularity ranking in the general population from 1880 and 1920. These names were selected to illustrate four possible trajectories that we have labeled as (1) established, rising; (2) established, falling; (3) novel, rising; and (4) novel, falling. We label Robert and Fred as "established" because these names were in the top 30 in 1880 (ranked #10 and #15, respectively), whereas Donald and Raleigh are labeled "novel" because they were then below the top 30 (ranked #246 and #499, respectively). And since Robert rose to #3 and Donald rose to #16, while Fred fell to #33 and Raleigh to #633, we label the former pair "rising" names while the latter pair are labeled as "falling." Our proposed method is based on the recognition that while both the cultural capital and immigrant-insecurity explanations imply that immigrants will show a preference for established over novel names, the theories differ in their implications regarding this second dimension-preferences for names rising and falling in popularity. In particular, if acculturative conservatism reflects a lack of mainstream cultural capital, then immigrants will be sensitive only to whether a name is established (and thus has a significant stock in the population relative to novel names) but will be unaware of whether a name is rising or falling. Thus, immigrants can be expected to use both Robert, an established name that was rising in fashion, and Fred, an established name that was declining in popularity. By contrast, if immigrants had sufficient mainstream cultural capital to distinguish rising from falling names, they would signal their membership in the host society with established but rising names such as Robert but would avoid Fred due to its declining popularity. More generally, if we find that immigrants exhibit a significant tendency to adopt established names but to avoid those established names that have been falling in popularity, this will imply that immigrant parents' conservative name choices were not due to a lack of mainstream cultural capital, and it would thus lend indirect support to the idea that their conservatism derived from feelings of insecurity that inclined them to signal membership in the host society.
Study Population
We use our analytic strategy to analyze names given to boys by American Jews in the years around 1918. At that time, the Jewish community consisted of approximately 3.4 million people, of whom roughly half lived in New York and about 85 percent of whom were first-and second-generation Americans from Eastern Europe; 4 almost all of the remainder were descendants of German Jews who had arrived in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. In addition to data availability, as discussed below, this population has several important advantages as a site for our study.
First, whereas the naming choices of many immigrant parents are heavily influenced by established patterns in their country of origin, such influence was generally unimportant in determining the English-language names selected by Eastern European Jewish immigrant parents (except for an avoidance of cultural practices with salient Christian associations, as discussed below). The key reason is that virtually all Jewish immigrants (like all traditional Jews today) gave their children two sets of given names in two different languages and corresponding alphabets: a religious name in Hebrew characters (which could be either Hebrew or Yiddish) and a secular name in English (Blatt 1998 (Blatt , 2004 . The secular name appears in official documents, beginning with the birth certificate, and would have been used for most forms of social interaction, especially outside the Jewish community, but also often in the community as well (especially if the family was not traditionally observant). All such children also had Hebrew names, which were used for religious purposes (e.g., in the synagogue, in Jewish weddings and divorces, on gravestones), but seldom for everyday interaction. 5 This naming system (which is roughly paralleled by contemporary practice among Chinese immigrants, who also frequently have one name in Chinese as well as an English name [Chang 2004, 108] ) is advantageous for our research objective, as it implies that ethnic and religious commitments could be expressed through Hebrew names, thereby giving Jewish parents considerable freedom to choose English names at least insofar as they do not have strong Christian associations. 6 Second, Eastern European Jewish immigrants represent an excellent research site because there is reason to believe that they acquired American cultural capital relatively rapidly but that their social acceptance into mainstream society lagged behind. There is considerable evidence that Eastern European Jewish immigrants generally went through the process of "Americanization" at a faster rate than other ethnic groups (Glazer 1957; Rosenthal 1960; Kessner 1977; Gans 1997) . 7 This rapid adoption of American cultural practices likely reflected both a great desire to become adept at American culture and various factors that facilitated such cultural-capital acquisition. This greater desire derived from the fact that Jewish immigrants were more likely than other contemporary immigrant groups to have emigrated on a permanent basis (given the comparably worse political and economic conditions for Jews in Eastern Europe), coupled with their recognition that a failure to acculturate formed a barrier to social mobility (Goldscheider and Zuckerman 1984, ch. 10; Learsi 1972 Learsi [1954 ; Spiro 1955) .
Beyond the desire to learn American culture, there were several important factors that helped Jews in this learning process. One such factor was their tendency to concentrate in the emerging urban centers (especially New York), which placed a relatively high demand on linguistic and symbolic-management skills, and which featured relatively effective public school systems. Indeed, in some ways, this may have placed immigrant Jews in closer proximity to the mainstream of American culture than many native communities in what was still a largely rural society. 8 Another important factor providing assistance with rapid acculturation was the presence of the German Jewish community. By the time Eastern European Jews arrived in America, their German counterparts were well established and highly motivated to quicken the acculturation and incorporation process for the newcomers (see, e.g., Glazier 2005). From their position of "glib condescension" (Howe 1989 (Howe [1976 ), 229), German Jews expended significant efforts to help Americanize the recent Eastern European arrivals:
In addition to the rudiments of citizenship, the established Jews sought to inculcate values and codes of behavior as part of the Americanization process. The Anglo-Jewish press, for example, purveyed a virtual list of "dos and don't's" for the benefit of the newcomers. Most of their strictures amounted to a counsel of low visibility: e.g., obey the law, avoid organized Jewish political activity; shun all forms of radical "isms"; guard against self-ghettoization. Implicit in those admonitions were two reminders: (1) Whatever any individual Jew does reflects upon the entire community; (2) we, the Germans, have worked hard to create the image of a law-abiding, loyal, America-oriented group-don't undo it. (Cohen 1984, 311) But while Eastern European Jewish immigrants apparently had a strong desire to Americanize and had unusually good access to American culture, their acceptance in American society was far from secure. This is captured well in Russell's (1955) account of the "racial displace(ment)" (28) process by which white Protestants fled in the face of an influx of Jews into the Boston neighborhood of Dorchester:
So soon as a few Jews bought into a street, the native families became restive, "For Sale" signs would appear in their windows, and in a few seasons they would have moved away … For it was still a disability to be Jewish, a disability felt more keenly by the deracinated American-born generation. Gentiles, if they could help it, would not live in the same neighborhood with the Jewish newcomers. Certain communities were restricted by binding but unwritten agreements against Jews. Officially there was no discrimination, but many businesses and jobs were closed to them. (22) (23) This reflected a broader tendency in American society to see Jews as alien and inferior. Thus, the motivation by German Jews to help their brethren must be seen in the context of a period that included the 1915 lynching of Leo Frank in Atlanta and rising anti-immigrant sentiment (culminating in the virtual closing of America's doors in 1921), often justified by "scientific racist" ideologies that regarded as inferior anyone who was not Northern European (e.g., Glazier 2005). Brodkin (1998) argues that it was not until after World War II and the joint experience of national service that American Jews were regarded as meriting "white" status in America's racial hierarchy, and it was perhaps not until after the publication and success of Will Herberg's Protestant-Catholic-Jew in 1955 that it became widely accepted that there was a common Judeo-Christian heritage that legitimized the Jews' otherwise alien religious practices. More generally, immigrant Jews of the period under study-just after World War I-are an excellent example of a community that had acquired a great deal of mainstream cultural capital but still felt insecure in their social acceptance.
Data
Our data come from military service Honor Roll records complied by the Bureau of War Records of the National Jewish Welfare Board in a book entitled American Jews in World War II: The Story of 550,000 Fighters for Freedom (Kaufman 1947) . From 1942 to 1946, this organization assembled the most complete records of Jewish servicemen/-women who either participated in the armed forces directly or worked in service activities. These records were made under strict standards of authentication: all records were sent to local communities for confirmation.
We limit our analyses to 19,948 male servicemen from four states that are chosen to effect broad geographic representation: New York (16,038 servicemen), Illinois (2,391), California (1,307), and Virginia (212 servicemen). We do not perform an analysis for women, because female names are relatively rare in these records. 9 Also, while men were drafted into service, which removes concerns with potential selection into our sample, among women service was voluntary. Thus, we might be concerned about potential omitted variables that influenced both the parent's choice of the name and the propensity of their daughter to serve. In total, the 19,948 servicemen had 783 different given names. 10 To test our assumption that these servicemen were born around 1920 and thus can be compared with national data from that year, we randomly extracted a sample (n = 213) of the servicemen. Using the Church of Latter-Day Saints Genealogy online database, we succeeded in locating 135 of these servicemen and determining their exact birth years. 11 The median birth year was 1918; the mean was 1917, with a standard deviation of 5.87.
Analysis and Results
We present our analysis in four steps. We begin by examining whether Jewish immigrants were acculturating by calculating the degree of overlap in names popular among Jewish servicemen and the general population. We find only partial overlap because Jews avoided names with strong Christian associations. This indicates that Jewish immigrants were acculturating, but that this acculturation was selective. Next, we examine whether this (selective) acculturation was conservative (i.e., exhibiting significant preference for established popular names rather than newly popular names). Then, we proceed to show that the names that served as effective substitutes for names with Christian associations were not names with Jewish associations or established popular names, but relatively rare mainstream names. We label this curious pattern "subcultural acculturation." Finally, having established that immigrant Jews indeed exhibited (selective) acculturative conservatism, we employ our proposed analytical strategy for disentangling the immigrant-insecurity explanation from the cultural capital explanation for acculturative conservatism.
Evidence of Selective Acculturation
In table 2, we present a comparison of the top 30 most popular names in the general population born in 1920 with that of the Jewish sample born around 1918, as well as information about the history and origin of each name. We find significant evidence of acculturation. Each of the 30 most popular mainstream names was adopted by at least some parents of the Jewish servicemen. Further, a substantial minority of the most popular names among Jewish boys (13 out of the top 30, and six out of the top 20) overlapped with the most popular names in the general population. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Lieberson 2000, 195-200) , this suggests that immigrants' choices of the host country's names gravitated toward the fashion in the general population, and it supports our assumption that Jewish immigrants were relatively free to choose English names.
At the same time, this acculturation was selective. In particular, Jewish immigrants in this period departed from the mainstream in one important way: names that are strongly associated with Christianity in general and with the New Testament in particular were noticeably less popular among Jews than they were in the general population. For example, while John, James, and Paul were ranked first, fourth, and fourteenth in the general population, these names-which are most this degree of overlap is slightly lower than that which was found in table 2 for the 1920 general population (13 out of 30 rather than 12), the degree of overlap in the top 20 is actually higher for 1880 (8) than for 1920 (6) . This degree of preference for what was popular in 1880 seems high when we consider that if we were to randomly draw samples from the American given names in 1920, the popularity distribution in a given sample should overlap significantly more with the 1920 popularity distribution than with the 1880 popularity distribution. Given that, the fact that the Jewish sample displayed almost as much (if the top 30 is used) or more (if top 20) overlap suggests considerable conservatism.
To test the statistical significance of this finding, we conducted a Monte Carlo experiment. Specifically, we drew from the 1920 general population 1,000 random samples of the same size as the Jewish sample. 12 For each of these random samples, we calculated four different measures of "overlap ratio." Each overall ratio measure compares (1) the overlap between the most popular names in the sample with the most popular names in the general population in 1920 with (2) the overlap between the most popular names in the sample with the most popular names in the general population in 1880. These four measures are distinguished based on whether they are calculated on the top 20 or the top 30 most popular names, and whether the denominator is the overlap in 1880 ("type 1") or the sum of the overlap in 1880 and the overlap in 1920 ("type 2"). 13 The results of this test indicate that acculturative conservatism by the Jewish parents was statistically significant. In particular, since 13 of the top 30 names in the Jewish sample were in the national top 30 in 1920 and 12 were in the national top 30 in 1880, this generates a type 1 overlap ratio of 1.08 (13/12). However, the mean of the type 1 overlap ratios of the 1,000 random sample is 1.52, with [1.39, 1.65] as the 95 percent confidence interval. This suggests that the type 1 overlap ratio of a random sample is very unlikely to be as low as that of the Jewish sample. Thus, compared with the general population, the Jewish sample is more likely to adopt names that were popular in 1880. Statistical significance was also achieved by the type 2 overlap ratio. The type 2 ratio of the Jewish sample is 0.52 (13/[13 + 12]), while the 1,000 random samples reach a mean as high as 0. 60, with [0.58, 0.62] as the 95 percent confidence interval. 14 Before analyzing the causes of this acculturative conservatism, it is worth considering whether this preference for established names was actually an artifact of Jewish immigrants' tendency to avoid names strongly associated with Christianity. If such names became more popular in the general population between 1880 and 1920, it is possible that this fact could account for Jewish immigrants' avoidance of newly popular names. This does not appear to be the case, however. Among the top 20 in 189, five names-Harry, Fred, Samuel, David, and Louisdeclined in popularity and were replaced with Richard, Harold, Paul, Raymond, and Donald. Of these, only Harold rose to the top 20 among Jews. While Jews likely avoided Paul because of the name's strong association with Christianity, the other three names were as legitimate for use by Jewish parents as the other names with relatively weak Christian associations. Meanwhile, whereas the popularity among Jews of David and Samuel might be explained by their Jewish associations, this does not explain the continued popularity among Jews of Harry and Louis. In sum, it appears that while (as shown in the previous section) Jewish acculturation was selective in that it avoided names with strong Christian associations, it was also distinctively conservative: conditional on choosing popular names, Jewish parents preferred established popular names over newly popular ones.
Was Acculturative Conservatism Responsible for Distinctively Jewish American Names?
Before analyzing why Jewish immigrants were acculturatively conservative, we must first consider another pattern that emerges from tables 2 and 3, and whether it too is a manifestation of acculturative conservatism. In particular, it is noteworthy that Jewish parents seem to effectively have "replaced" strongly Christianassociated names with a few names-such as Stanley, Sidney, Irving, Morris, and Jerome-that stand out as favored by the Jewish immigrants but not by the general population, neither in 1880 nor in 1920. The popularity of these names might not seem puzzling because many Americans tend to regard them as classically Jewish (see Lieberson 2000, 174, 216) . But in fact, these names do not have any associations in Jewish religion, nor did they have any roots in (Eastern European) Jewish culture. Their emergence as Jewish names is a distinctly American phenomenon. That is, these names became known in the United States as distinctively Jewish names as a result of their popularity among American Jews. Thus, to call these names Jewish is to beg the question of how they became Jewish.
One possible explanation is that while these names were not popular in 1880 (the earliest birth year available from the Social Security Administration), they were popular in the prior generation, and their popularity thus reflects a form of acculturative conservatism. To check this, we obtained name data from Union veterans of the Civil War, who would have been born around 1840. These results are presented in table 4. We see that the names that had distinctive appeal for immigrant Jews were not popular in 1840. While it is possible that some of these names rose and fell in popularity between 1840 and 1880, this seems relatively unlikely, especially given the relatively slow rate of fashion cycles in 19th-century naming fashion Lieberson and Lynn 2003) .
This implies that the selective acculturation of American Jews was marked by two aspects: (1) avoidance of Christian-associated names; and (2) a dynamic we label "subcultural acculturation." The latter occurs when an immigrant community adopts relatively unpopular cultural forms in the host society, which gain popularity in that community due to fashion dynamics that are internal to that community. In particular, it appears that some Jewish parents were responding specifically to the popularity of names among their peers, and this led to distinctive popularity levels for certain names among Jews. We consider the implications of this result in the last section of the article.
Disentangling the Two Explanations of Acculturative Conservatism
Having established the existence of subcultural acculturation alongside acculturative conservatism, we now focus on understanding what drove such acculturative conservatism. To recall, there are two possibilities. First, immigrants might lack mainstream cultural capital in that they desired to keep up with the Note: In bold are names that appear among the top 30 in both the general population and the Jewish sample. In italics are names that appear among the top 20 in both the general population and the Jewish sample.
latest fashion, but they did not have sufficient knowledge to do so. Second, immigrants might be aware of the latest fashion, but their sense of insecurity as members of the host society leads them to select established names that more clearly convey membership in the host society. As discussed, our strategy for disentangling the two explanations is to test whether Jewish immigrants avoided names that were falling in popularity; such avoidance would suggest that they possessed the mainstream cultural capital necessary to be fashionable but they opted for safe choices. To clarify our analytic approach, we present in tables 5 and 6 the data that are based on the analysis of the top 30 most popular names in 1880 and 1920. From table 5, we see that in the general population, 19 of the 30 names that were established as most popular in 1880 remained in the top 30 in 1920, and that the 11 that had dropped out of the top 30 had (necessarily) been replaced by 11 newly popular names. This carries a key implication: If the Jewish population were picking randomly from established names because they could not distinguish between those that were no longer fashionable and those that remained fashionable, the likelihood of picking a name that had dropped out of the top 30 would be 11/30 or 58 percent. In fact, however, we see from table 6 that of the 12 established names by 1880 that were popular among Jewish servicemen, only one of these (Samuel) was a name that dropped out of the top 30 by 1920. Thus, while Jewish parents were considerably more conservative than the general population (as shown in the previous section and as shown in the last column of table 6 by their low ratio of adopting newly popular relative to established names [2/16 = 0.125 versus 11/30 = 0.366 in the general population], they display a marked tendency to avoid those established names that were falling in popularity.
To verify this result in a systematic way, we extended the analysis for the top 30 names to the top X names. X is a continuous variable with a range from 31 to 1,000 (as 1,000 is the maximum rank that we have in our general population data). Also to assess statistical significance, we again ran a Monte Carlo experiment. In particular, we drew from the 1920 general population 1,000 random samples of the same size as the Jewish sample. For each of these random samples, we noted the popularity of the names in the sample and calculated the ratio of established names that fell out of the top X (from 1880 to 1920) to the established names that remained popular, for all top X names. A lower value of this ratio indicates a stronger tendency to avoid falling names. Then we tested whether this ratio for the Jewish sample can be considered statistically different from the Note: a The sample for calculating the percentage around 1840 is the names of the soldiers who participated in the Union's army in the American Civil War (1861-1865). The sample size is 2,672,341. The (first) names' frequencies is obtained by searching these names via the Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System (CWSS), a database that contains the information of the men who served in the armies during the Civil War. b This number also includes the percentage of the first name "Jackson." Jack and Jackson cannot be distinguished by using the searching engine provided by CWSS, so the actual percentage of "Jack" should be much lower than 0.22 percent. c This number also includes the percentage of the first name "Hamilton." d This number also includes the percentage of the first name "Maximilian." e This number also includes the percentage of the first name "Nathaniel" and "Johnathan."
general population by comparing this ratio to the sampling distribution for the random samples from that population. To exclude the possibility that the Jewish parents' tendency to choose established names was driven by their avoidance of the Christian names that were rising in popularity in the general population, we exclude Christian names from the above analysis. 15 These names are shown in table 7. Since Gabriel, Joseph, and Nathaniel are also traditional Jewish names, they are not excluded from analysis.
The results are presented in figure 2 . The solid black curve shows the means of the ratios across 1,000 random samples from the general population, for all top X names, and the dashed curves show the 95 percent confident intervals around the means. The solid gray curve shows the ratios of the Jewish sample. We see that the gray curve is considerably below the 95 percent confidence interval for all X. This suggests that our key result is very robust.
In brief, the evidence suggests that Jewish immigrant parents made discriminating choices based on significant awareness of contemporary fashion. They seem to have exhibited a stronger tendency to avoid names that were falling in popularity than was exhibited by the population in general. This suggests that 
Conclusion
The main contribution of this article is to shift our model of the acculturation process so that it incorporates two key lessons from recent cultural sociology:
(1) that cultural expressions reflect strategic choices to deploy a subset of one's larger stock of cultural capital (Swidler 1986 (Swidler , 2001 ; and (2) that individuals who feel secure as "unquestioned members" of a group or a community (Hughes 1946, 517) are more likely to take risks with their cultural expressions (see Obukhova, Zuckerman, and Zhang 2014; Zuckerman forthcoming; cf. Phillips et al. 2013 ). When applied to the acculturation process, these lessons recast this processand the challenge of immigrant incorporation more generally-in a subtle but important way. The past literature on immigrant incorporation has tended to understand acculturation as a matter of learning the host society's culture. Our approach similarly assumes that cultural-capital acquisition is a necessary condition for immigrants to express themselves in a way that signals capability and commitment in the host society. But our analysis also suggests that cultural-capital acquisition is insufficient for full incorporation in mainstream society. In particular, we have seen that even immigrants who learn the mainstream culture quickly may still shy away from deploying that cultural capital in the way that native members of society do, and this is consistent with the possibility that their sense of acceptance in the host society may lag behind their cultural-capital acquisition.
We focused on early 20th-century Jewish immigrants to the United States because historical research suggests that this population was marked by rapid learning of American culture coupled with uneven social acceptance. As predicted, the particular names chosen by American Jewish parents suggest that they were aware of contemporary fashion (as indicated by their avoidance of formerly popular names that had declined in popularity), but they nonetheless favored the safe route of avoiding trendy names and instead selected names that were popular in the prior generation and had remained popular. While this pattern cannot be easily explained by American Jewish parents' lack of cultural capital, it is consistent with the idea that individuals who feel insecure in their group membership will favor expressions that are clear signals of membership. Names that are established and still popular fulfill this role; trendy names are riskier since they are less established as signals of societal membership.
Implications
An important implication of our analysis is that the acculturation process should be broken down into two phases: (1) the acquisition of cultural capital (in the mainstream or perhaps in a subculture); and (2) the achievement of taken-for-grantedness as recognized members of society. These elements may be regarded as developmental stages insofar as element (1) must first occur for element (2) to be observed. That is, one can innovate within a culture only when one is a recognized member of that society. A potential policy implication of this analysis is that interventions intended to facilitate immigrant incorporation by speeding the acculturation process must focus not only on socializing immigrants into the host culture, but equally importantly, on breaking down social barriers that limit their acceptance in the host society. The recognition of these as two distinct phases is important, as the second goal is likely much harder to achieve than the first one.
Moreover, the fact that these stages are distinct may clarify certain contemporary situations where long-standing immigrant groups feel alienated from mainstream society (e.g., Muslim immigrants to Europe or African American or Chinese immigrants to the United States). For example, despite a long history of cultural exchange and migration, in Europe, Muslim immigrants, and especially practicing Muslims, are seen as minorities who are "different" from the mainstream (see Foner and Alba 2008; Ozyurt 2013) . This means that taken-for-grantedness in the host society membership is largely unattainable for Muslim immigrants in Europe even in situations where over successive generations they have gained considerable success in mastering the host society's cultural capital. A key ingredient breeding alienation in such situations may be that immigrant groups possessing cultural capital in the host society continue finding that host society members question their capability and commitment to the host society even when they are socially integrated (Bisin et al. 2008) .
Of course, the utility of applying the lessons from this article to contemporary cases must remain tentative. One caveat in particular deserves underlining. In particular, while the two phases of acculturation are analytically distinct and seem temporally distinct in the specific case of early 20th-century American Jews, it remains an open question how distinct these phases are in general. To recall, we selected this case precisely because we thought this immigrant group would be unusual in the relative speed at which it acquired skills in navigating American culture while remaining socially marginal. But it seems likely that in other instances these two phases will generally co-occur. After all, the general motivation for acquiring cultural capital is so that one may use it. As such, it remains for future research to explore the conditions under which the analytic distinction between the phase of cultural-capital acquisition and the phase of cultural innovation has empirical application.
Finally, our findings concerning "subcultural acculturation" have important implications for our understanding of acculturation and also raise important questions for future research. We introduced this term to refer to the curious pattern by which names for which Jewish immigrants had no cultural or religious affinity gained significant popularity specifically among immigrant Jews. Our study appears to be the first to show that such popularity cannot be explained by acculturative conservatism (as we demonstrated, these names were not popular in 1840). Instead, the pattern seems more consistent with the operation of a fashion dynamic endogenous to the Jewish community (see Kaufman 2004; Obukhova, Zuckerman, and Zhang 2014 for a review) .
This finding is notable because it suggests a more nuanced picture of the acculturation process, one that can be appreciated in light of the emphasis of recent research on two aspects of the acculturation process: (1) that immigrant groups face a dilemma of choosing which subculture in the host society should be the focus of their acculturation; and (2) that immigrants tend to balance their adoption of cultural practices from the host society with a continued commitment to practices from their immigrant community (Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997) . The finding of subcultural acculturation suggests an additional pattern involving the interaction between immigrant communities and mainstream culture. In particular, we have demonstrated that within the same immigrant community, there were two distinctive responses to the question of how to acculturate, one that seemed aimed at a general audience in the host society (acculturative conservatism) and one that seemed aimed at a subcultural audience-but using the "language" of the mainstream culture.
The latter strategy, which seems to involve an appropriation or reworking of the mainstream culture such that it simultaneously signals membership in the immigrant community and in the mainstream culture (cf. Murray 2010), is quite intriguing, as it introduces inventions into the mainstream culture, which the native-born often assume to be practices from the immigrants' home countries. One such invention is "fortune cookies," which are uniformly offered at the end of a meal by Chinese restaurants in America, but were actually invented by Chinese or Japanese immigrants (Lee 2009 ). Names such as Stanley and Irving may be viewed as having been produced according to an analogous process. This naming strategy may also help account for the curious finding recently documented by Goldstein and Stecklov (2016) , whereby Russian immigrants of the early 20th century (who were largely Jewish) were more successful when their children had been given names that were common in the Jewish community but uncommon in the general society. Based on the findings of this article, it is likely that these names reflected subcultural acculturation rather than ethnic maintenance. Thus, the clearest pathway to mobility may have been the "fortune cookie" strategy of signaling ethnic identity in a manner that conformed to mainstream expectations.
A full understanding of "subcultural acculturation" and how it relates to acculturative conservatism must await future research. Even for the case we examine, the specific mechanisms by which this endogenous dynamic operated are hard to discern. Did Jewish parents erroneously think that these names were popular in the native population (cf., Wirth 1956 Wirth [1928 , 241-43)? Or did they know that these names were popular only among Jews but selected them because they thought it was an effective way of signaling that they were members of the American Jewish community? Moreover, insofar as the wave of Jewish emigrants from Eastern Europe also produced significant communities in the British Empire, Argentina, and elsewhere, future studies might examine which aspect of this phenomenon was shaped by factors that were particular to the American environment.
Notes
1. This assumption does not hold today since the popularity of names is now publicized. 2. For each year after 1879, the US Social Security Administration (http://www.ssa.gov/ oact/babynames/) publishes the frequency of names that appear in its records at least five times for either gender.
12. We obtained the 1,000 random samples as follows. First, we estimated a popularity distribution for 14,100 names given to the 1,100,915 boys born in 1920 according to the Social Security Administration data. Then we drew 1,000 random samples, each of which is the same size as our Jewish subsample of 19,948 boys, and randomly chose names for the simulated boys based on the popularity of these names in the estimated popularity distribution. We then assessed the tendency for the simulated subsample to pick established versus newly popular names and compared that with the Jewish subsample. 13. The disadvantage of a simple ratio of overlap in 1880 over overlap in 1920 is that since the denominator is relatively close to zero, it is "harder" for the ratio to reach a high number if the overlap in 1920 is low. 14. To exclude the possibility that the above results are biased by artificial truncation of the top names, we repeat these analyses for different truncations of top names, from top 20 to top 1,000. As shown in the supplementary material, the acculturative conservatism by the Jewish parents is robust to these different truncations. 15. The sources include http://www.behindthename.com/glossary/view/new_testament, and http://life.familyeducation.com/baby/baby-names/45509.html.
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